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Reflections on the Future of Class Actions
Robert H. Klonoff*
This Essay, a condensed version of a longer piece that is forthcoming
in the Washington University Law Review, argues that in recent years
courts have cut back sharply on the ability to bring class action
lawsuits. The Essay surveys ten disturbing trends, each of which makes
it increasingly difficult for class representatives and counsel to obtain
class certification.
INTRODUCTION
In a forthcoming, full-length article, 1 I describe how federal courts in
recent years have cut back on the availability of class action lawsuits.
These courts have tightened the requirements for almost every element
of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. This
case law undermines the compensation, deterrence, and efficiency
functions of the class action device. In this Essay, I discuss the major
conclusions of my forthcoming article.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Modern Rule 23, adopted in 1966, was designed to encourage more
frequent use of class actions, 2 and for many years, it had the desired
effect. Courts certified even complex mass tort cases, driven in part by

* Dean and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. The author serves as the academic
member of the United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and
previously served as an Associate Reporter for the American Law Institute’s project, Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation (West 2010). The author has also served as a class action expert
witness on a number of occasions, and is a co-author of the first casebook on class actions,
originally published in 1998 and now in its third edition. As a private attorney, the author
handled more than 100 class actions, primarily on the defense side. The views expressed herein
represent solely those of the author. The author wishes to thank his research assistants, Jacob
Abbott and Ben Pepper, for their outstanding assistance on this Essay.
1. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
All page references in subsequent footnotes are based on the manuscript of this forthcoming
article, which can be accessed from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038985
(last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
2. See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970) (explaining
purposes of Rule 23).

533

7_KLONOFF.DOCX

534

12/14/2012 4:22 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

(but not limited to) the asbestos crisis. 3 Beginning in the mid-1990s,
however, courts became increasingly concerned that class certification
was pressuring defendants to settle even questionable cases, using terms
such as “shakedown” and “judicial blackmail” to describe the coercion. 4
Because interlocutory appeal was rarely available, 5 defendants had no
practical avenue for appellate review of a district court’s class
certification decision, other than taking a potentially bankrupting case to
trial and challenging class certification on appeal of the final judgment.
Defendants were also concerned that many multistate class actions
raising state law claims were brought in state courts, and that those
cases were often assigned to elected judges who were unsympathetic to
out-of-state corporate defendants. 6
Rule 23(f), adopted in 1998, solved the reviewability problem for
federal court cases by providing discretionary appellate review of an
order granting or denying class certification. 7 The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 8 largely solved the concern about state
court venues by expanding federal jurisdiction to cover most major
class actions. 9 As a result of Rule 23(f) and CAFA, there is now a
substantial body of federal case law across a broad spectrum of class
certification issues. 10 And while the jurisprudence has been far from
uniform, several recent trends have emerged that make class
certification more difficult to obtain than at any point since the adoption
of modern Rule 23 in 1966. 11 This Essay discusses ten troublesome
trends.
3. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 6–7.
4. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Const. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension Fund (Local
66), 579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[C]lass certification creates insurmountable pressure on
defendants to settle . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Castano v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996)). See generally Klonoff, supra note 1, at 4, 7,
10, 19, 64–65 (citing cases and providing further historical background).
5. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Id. at 16.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
9. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 17.
10. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1593, 1610 (2008) (“CAFA has increased not only the number of class action removals to
federal court, but also the number of class action original filings in federal court.”).
11. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 23–25, 30–133 (4th ed. 2012) (stating that to obtain class certification, plaintiffs must
satisfy three threshold requirements: a proper class definition, and a representative who is both a
member of the class and has a live claim; four explicit requirements under Rule 23(a)
(numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation); and a requirement that the
putative class satisfy all the elements of at least one subdivision of Rule 23(b)—(b)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(B), (b)(2), or (b)(3)).
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II. RECENT TRENDS
A. Resolving the Merits at the Class Certification Stage
A significant point of departure from earlier decisions is the view of
virtually all federal circuits that district courts must resolve merits
issues when those issues overlap with a class certification
requirement. 12 This approach is a significant change from earlier cases
that had allowed class certification to be based on the pleadings or on a
threshold evidentiary showing. 13 For example, under the view currently
espoused by many courts, if the plaintiff’s expert in an antitrust case
testifies that the antitrust injury and damages can be proven on a classwide basis, whereas defendant’s expert testifies that individualized
proof is required, the court must choose which expert is more
persuasive in deciding whether to certify the case as a class action.14
This case law imposes a new, substantial burden on plaintiffs and means
that much—if not all—merits discovery must now occur prior to the
class certification hearing. 15
B. Class Definition
Although the requirement is not expressly set forth in Rule 23(a),
courts have universally held that a clear, objective class definition is
required before a court can certify a case as a class action. 16 Prior to
2000, it was rare for a court to deny class certification based on a flawed
definition. Instead, courts typically allowed plaintiffs to reformulate
their class definitions when such definitions were found to be
deficient. 17 Recently, however, courts have been far more willing to
12. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if they
overlap with the merits . . . .”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674–75 (7th Cir.
2001) (listing merit issues requiring resolution prior to “any sensible decision about class
certification”). See generally Klonoff, supra note 1, at 20–25 (tracing the development of Rule
23 jurisprudence requiring evidence as opposed to allegations).
13. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 20.
14. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 324 (“Resolving expert disputes in order to
determine whether a class certification requirement has been met is always a task for the court
. . . .”).
15. The Supreme Court may shed light on this issue in the 2012 Term. See Behrend v.
Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 80 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-864) (granting certiorari on the issue of
“[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class
has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis”).
16. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 34. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (requiring “[a]n order
that certifies a class action” to “define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses”).
17. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 35.
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deny class certification because of a flawed class definition without
giving plaintiffs a chance to rewrite the definition. 18
C. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that a court may certify a class only if “the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”19
Because courts have held that classes with as few as twenty to forty
members are sufficiently numerous, plaintiffs have rarely had difficulty
satisfying this requirement. 20 Indeed, defendants have frequently
stipulated to numerosity. In recent years, however, courts have denied
class certification in a significant number of cases based on
numerosity. 21 These courts have required strict proof of class size and
have refused to apply common sense assumptions (for example, that a
particular definition is likely to encompass hundreds or thousands of
members, even if it is not possible to come up with a precise number). 22
D. Commonality
Under Rule 23(a)(2), a court cannot certify a class unless “there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.” 23 Prior to 2011,
commonality was construed liberally by courts and was thus rarely an
issue for plaintiffs; in fact, defendants frequently stipulated to the
existence of a common question of law or fact. 24 In Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 25 however, the Supreme Court substantially increased the
burden on plaintiffs by requiring that the common question be
essentially dispositive: “[The] common contention . . . must . . . be of
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 26 This
18. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Ascertainability:
Reading between the Lines of Rule 23, 26 B.N.A. TOXICS L. REP. (Mar. 17, 2011) (recounting
cases where the court found that the class definition was impermissibly broad or otherwise
problematic); Klonoff, supra note 1, at 36–37 (citing cases).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
20. See Klonoff, supra note 1, at 41–42 (stating that the “numerosity bar [is] not high,” and
noting that classes of forty or more have usually been deemed sufficient, and in some instances,
classes of only thirteen or twenty members have been deemed sufficient).
21. See id. at 42–47 (discussing recent circuit court decisions that have used the numerosity
requirement as a rationale for denying class certification, indicating a trend towards heightened
judicial scrutiny with respect to numerosity).
22. Id. at 42–45 (citing cases).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
24. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 47 (citing cases).
25. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
26. Id. at 2551 (emphasis added).
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heightened burden, as the dissent in Dukes pointed out, 27 is akin to the
“predominance” standard of Rule 23(b)(3). 28 But there are four kinds
of classes under Rule 23—those under (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and
(b)(3). Under the text of these subdivisions, only (b)(3) contains a
predominance requirement.
Thus, Dukes arguably requires
predominance under all four types of class actions. As a practical
matter, Dukes gives class defendants a new weapon to challenge class
certification, especially in cases brought under (b)(1) and (b)(2).
E. Adequacy of Representation
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” 29 This requirement is
well-grounded: Because class actions are representative actions, it is
important that class representatives and class counsel be knowledgeable,
competent, and free of conflicts of interest. 30 In recent years, however,
many courts have added a troublesome new component to adequacy:
class representatives and counsel may be inadequate if they omit from
their complaint potentially viable claims, even if those claims are not
suitable for class certification. 31 The rationale is that the failure to bring
such claims may later preclude class members from asserting them by
way of collateral estoppel or res judicata. 32 These cases undermine the
traditional notion that the very job of the lawyer is to select the best—or
most viable—claims from among the universe of potential claims. Part
of that assessment means excluding claims that are not suitable for class
certification. Moreover, courts adopting this approach do not attempt to
minimize the res judicata or collateral estoppel effects, such as
providing in the certification order that the action is without prejudice to
the ability of class members to pursue claims not raised in the class
action. 33

27. Id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring “that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring adequacy of counsel
and setting forth a framework for selecting class counsel).
30. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy
of Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671 (referring to the need for adequate
representation in class action cases to ensure efficiency and thoroughness throughout the process
and to obtain a fair resolution of the dispute).
31. See Klonoff, supra note 1, at 56–60 (discussing recent cases holding that omission of
potentially viable claims constitutes inadequacy).
32. Id. at 56.
33. See id. at 57–62 (describing case law trends).
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F. Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) permits classes seeking declaratory or injunctive
relief. 34 Traditionally, courts permitted plaintiffs to plead monetary
claims along with claims for declaratory or injunctive relief, so long as
the monetary relief was of lesser importance. 35 All federal circuits that
had addressed the issue had permitted back pay in employment
discrimination actions under (b)(2). 36 In Dukes, however, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that back pay could not be sought in a (b)(2)
action. 37 Under (b)(2), only incidental monetary damages (which do
not include back pay) are appropriate. 38 Indeed, the Court left open the
possibility that even incidental damages under (b)(2) might not be
consistent with due process, given that (b)(2) does not afford class
members the right to opt out of the class. 39
G. Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance
In recent years, many courts have adopted a virtually per se rule that
fraud actions cannot be certified under (b)(3) when individualized
reliance issues exist. 40 Similarly, many courts have adopted an equally
inflexible approach in holding that cases involving the laws of multiple
states fail the predominance requirement stated in (b)(3). 41 By adopting
such a rigid approach in fraud and choice-of-law cases, courts provide
plaintiffs with no real opportunity to show that, despite the
individualized issues, common issues predominate.
H. Settlement Certification
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 42 the Supreme Court held that
when class certification is sought simultaneously with approval of a
class-wide settlement, the plaintiffs must nonetheless satisfy all the
requirements of Rule 23 for a contested class action. The only
exception is that plaintiffs need not satisfy the manageability component
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
35. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that only
“incidental” damages could be sought in a (b)(2) class); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (adopting a more flexible view than Allison—that is, an
ad hoc test that looks at “the relative importance of the remedies sought”).
36. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 66–67.
37. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 68–72 (citing cases).
41. Id. at 79–82. Some courts also reject such actions under the manageability component of
Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement. Id. at 79.
42. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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of superiority when the class is brought under Rule 23(b)(3). 43 Thus,
for example, in a (b)(3) settlement class, plaintiffs must still show that
common issues predominate over individual issues. Amchem has had
serious adverse repercussions. Specifically, a number of courts have
rejected class-wide settlements in light of Amchem, 44 and many mass
tort actions now settle outside of Rule 23, without the required
protection of judicial review of the fairness of the settlement. 45
I. Issues Classes
One significantly underutilized provision of Rule 23 is subsection
(c)(4), which provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues.” 46 Although not all courts have curtailed issues classes, there is
cause for serious concern.
In the view of some courts, “(c)(4) is a ‘housekeeping’ rule that does
not alter the usual predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3),” meaning
that “the case as a whole must still satisfy the predominance test.” 47 To
be sure, some courts have taken a more practical approach to issue
certification. Under one formulation, which has been endorsed by the
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation,
the proper inquiry under Rule 23(c)(4) is whether certification of one or
more issues will “materially advance” the case as a whole. 48
Quite apart from the question of when Rule 23(c)(4) permits a court
to certify an issues class, some courts have also ruled that the Seventh
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause 49 acts as an additional constraint
on a court’s authority to sever distinct issues for trial. 50 As one court
43. Id. at 620.
44. See, e.g., In re Grand Theft Auto Video Game Consumer Litig., 251 F.R.D. 139, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Many courts have determined that differences in underlying state laws
applicable to individual putative class members[] . . . preclude a finding of predominance.”); In re
Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying certification solely
for the purposes of a settlement based on the predominance of individual questions).
45. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (listing criteria governing class
settlements).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
47. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 83 (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
48. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (2010). See also, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that certifying the
issue of defendants’ scheme to defraud would not “materially advance” the litigation because it
would fail to dispose of larger issues).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury[] shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).
50. Klonoff, supra note 1, at 88–91. See, e.g., In re Rhone–Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court may not “divide issues between separate trials in a
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explained, “The Seventh Amendment entitles parties to have fact issues
decided by one jury, and prohibits a second jury from reexamining
those facts and issues.” 51 Therefore, the argument runs, because juries
in later proceedings would need to “reexamine” facts that were
previously determined by the first jury, this overlap would run afoul of
the Reexamination Clause. 52 Again, not all courts have endorsed such a
rigorous approach; as one court explained, “the Seventh Amendment
prohibition is not against having two juries review the same evidence
but rather against having two juries decide the same essential issues.” 53
In short, while the cases are divided, the ability to bring issues classes
has been substantially curtailed by many courts.
J. Defendants’ Ability to Eliminate Class Actions with
Arbitration Clauses
It has become common in many contracts to require individual
arbitration of disputes and to prohibit class-wide proceedings. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 54 the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted a state common law unconscionability
doctrine that generally barred class action waivers in consumer
contracts. 55 The full implications of Concepcion could be enormous. 56
Concepcion makes it easier for potential defendants to avoid class
litigation (and class arbitration) by inserting class action waiver clauses
into their written agreements. One developing issue is whether the
holding in Concepcion—which involved a dispute over a tax under a
cell phone service agreement—also governs in other contexts. For
example, the Second Circuit held that Concepcion did not require
enforcement of a class action waiver clause in an antitrust suit by a class
of merchants against the credit card company defendant. 57 The court
explained that “if plaintiffs cannot pursue their allegations of antitrust
law violations as a class, it is financially impossible for the plaintiffs to
way that the same issue is reexamined by a different jury”); Castano, 84 F.3d at 750–51 (relying
on the court’s reasoning in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. in reversing and remanding the case
with instructions that the district court dismiss the class complaint).
51. Castano, 84 F.3d at 750.
52. See Klonoff, supra note 1, at 88–89 (explaining the rationale of courts that have relied on
the Seventh Amendment in rejecting class certification).
53. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 452 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (citing In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
54. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
55. Id. at 1753.
56. See Klonoff, supra note 1, at 96–99.
57. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub
nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12133).
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seek to vindicate their federal statutory rights.” 58 Other courts,
however, have read Concepcion much more expansively. 59 The
Supreme Court has granted review in the Second Circuit case to resolve
the issue. 60
A particularly troublesome aspect of Concepcion is that it may
preclude aggregation in cases that the Supreme Court has said are “at
the very core of the class action mechanism” 61—so-called “negative
value” suits. These cases, practically speaking, can only be litigated on
a class basis, because the individual claims are too small to justify the
expense of an individual lawsuit. Concepcion may thus foreclose many
types of small claims cases, thereby undermining the compensation and
deference functions of the class action device.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND
POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
A. Countertrends
Despite the troubling jurisprudential developments described in Part
II, the class action device remains viable to some extent. To begin with,
in certain cases, plaintiffs can avoid some of the most restrictive case
law by filing class actions in federal circuits that have shown greater
receptivity to class actions. Indeed, recent figures from the Federal
Judicial Center’s study on post-CAFA class action filings suggest that
this sort of forum shopping is already taking place. 62
Moreover, despite this overall disturbing trend, class actions remain
alive and relatively well in several subject areas. Courts have continued
to authorize class certification in a number of antitrust cases, ERISA
cases, securities cases, and wage and hour cases because these types of
cases tend to have important overarching common issues. 63 Of course,
58. Id. at 219.
59. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212–16 (11th Cir. 2011)
(applying Concepcion despite the argument that bringing an individual action would be costly).
60. American Express, 2012 WL 3096737, at *1.
61. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
62. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2007). See Erichson, supra note 10, at
1613–14 (highlighting that the district courts within the Ninth Circuit saw the biggest increase in
post-CAFA filings). See also Klonoff, supra note 1, at 100–01 (summarizing recent data on class
action forum selection).
63. See Klonoff, supra note 1, at 70–71 (summarizing cases in which these common
overarching issues permitted class certification). See also In re Wash. Mut. Mortg.-Backed Secs.
Litig., 276 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (certifying securities class action); In re Wellbutrin
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Concepcion may soon adversely affect some of these areas.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has not been as
consistently anti-class action as might appear at first blush. 64 Three
recent decisions are illustrative. First, in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Court held that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 conflicted with, and therefore preempted, a
contrary state rule that would have otherwise prohibited the suit from
being brought as a class action in federal court. 65 Second, in Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., decided during the same term as
Dukes and Concepcion, the Court held (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s
holding to the contrary) that a securities fraud plaintiff did not need to
prove that the defendant’s misconduct caused the economic loss at issue
in the case in order to obtain class certification. 66 Finally, in Smith v.
Bayer Corp., the Court held that a federal district court, having denied
class certification, could not enjoin a West Virginia court from
certifying a similar class against the same defendant. 67 These cases
certainly rebut the notion that the Court is steadfastly anti-class action.
Yet, these cases raise issues that do not arise frequently. Thus, in terms
of their likely impact, these cases are far less significant than
Concepcion, Dukes, and Amchem, which raise issues that arise
repeatedly in class actions.
B. Possible Approaches to the Recent Trends
There are no easy ways to address the troubling case law
developments discussed in Part II of this Essay. The proper approach
will differ from case to case. On some issues, courts can alter their
approaches as a matter of case law. On others—such as where the
Supreme Court has rendered a decision or there is an unresolved
conflict among the circuits—a rule change may be required. And with

XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2011 WL 3563385, at *1, *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011)
(certifying (b)(3) classes of direct and indirect purchasers of a prescription drug); Bauer v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 562–64 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (certifying ERISA class under
(b)(3)).
64. See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing
into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1028 (2012) (explaining that the cases
appear to be based upon the individual issues and circumstances presented to the Court and not
upon any broad theoretical underpinnings).
65. 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2011) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion
provided the crucial fifth vote for the majority in Shady Grove, albeit on somewhat narrower
grounds than the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia. See id. at 1448–60 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
66. 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011).
67. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011).
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respect to Concepcion, which is based on the FAA, congressional action
will be necessary. 68
CONCLUSION
In appropriate cases, the class action provides a private remedy for
achieving mass justice. In some cases, it may be the only realistic
vehicle for recovery. The threat of a class action also deters
wrongdoing. In addition, a class action avoids the need to resolve the
same common issues repeatedly for numerous claimants. Courts should
not lose sight of the value and efficiency inherent in the class action
device. And they should not allow abstract concerns about blackmail
settlements or the theoretical possibility of abuse by class counsel to
erode a device that worked so well for many years following the
adoption of modern Rule 23 in 1966.

68. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (making predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in employment, consumer, and civil rights cases).

